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A Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Under Article 15 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice
Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)1 enables a commanding officer to sentence a service member who has
committed a minor infraction2 to thirty days of correctional custody.

1. 10 u.s.c. § 815 (1970).
The UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970), was enacted by Congress in 1950 to provide
a uniform system of justice for all the military services. The UCMJ lists punishable
crimes, establishes the military judicial system under which allegations of criminal
conduct are adjudicated, and details the procedural safeguards to be accorded an
alleged offender. Article 36 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1970), authorizes the
President to prescribe further procedures to be used at trials, but they may not be
contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of the UCMJ. The executive orders
promulgated under article 36 have the effect of law and are found in the MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter MCM].
2, See note 8 infra.
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The article 15 proceeding offers few procedural safeguards; 8 among
the protections lacking is the right to counsel.4 This Note will consider whether the failure of the military to provide counsel at an
article 15 proceeding is consistent with the sixth amendment,6 which
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The
Note first will discuss the extent to which military necessity qualifies
the application of the Bill of Rights and the sixth amendment to
armed forces personnel. Then, assuming that military necessity does
not bar the application of the sixth amendment to article 15 cases,
the substantive determinants of the right to counsel-for example,
the presence or absence of a "criminal prosecution" or "imprisonment"-will be discussed. Finally, the Note will examine whether
the right to counsel demands that the accused receive the aid of a
trained attorney.
Article 15 was designed to provide a more efficient mode of discipline than the court-martial system6 and to avoid the stigma associ3. See Miller, A Long Look at Article 15, 28 MIL. L. REv. 37, 50-52 (1965); Note,
The Unconstitutional Burden of Article 15, 82 YALE L.J. 1481 (1973). Examples of
procedural rights that arc absent under article 15 arc the right to cross-examine
witnesses and the right to be protected . from double jeopardy. The opportunity to
examine or cross-examine is left to the sole discretion of the commanding officer.
The service member is authorized only to indicate to the commander the relevant
areas to pursue in questioning a witness. Army Reg. 27-10, 11 3-14b (Change 12,
Dec. 1973). Article 15 punishment does not prevent the commander from prosecuting
the service member in a court-martial for more serious charges arising out of the
same conduct. IO U.S.C. § 815(£) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, 11 128b; United States
v. Fretwell, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 377, 29 C.M.R. 193 (1960).
4. The right to counsel encompasses both the right to have an attorney present
at a judicial proceeding and the right to have an attorney appointed if the accused
is financially unable to obtain counsel. The two rights arc merged in the military
context because the UCMJ establishes a right to appointed counsel, regardless of
ability to pay, whenever retained counsel is allowed to be present. IO U.S.C. §§ 832(b),
838(b) (1970); MCM, supra note I, 11 48a. This policy is also followed in situations
not covered by the UCMJ. For example, the Manual for Courts-Martial provides
that a person subject to a military interrogation has the right to have military
counsel assigned to him regardless of his ability to pay. MCM, supra, 11 140a(2).
5. The sixth amendment, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was
enacted as a limitation solely upon the federal government. Barron v. Baltimore,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833). The military is under federal auspices, and thus a service
member's right to counsel, if it exists, must be derived under the sixth amendment
directly, without incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. See also note 85 infra.
6. There are three types of courts-martial in the armed forces: summary, special,
and general. Summary courts-martial have jurisdiction to try all service members
except officers, cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen for any noncapital offense
punishable under the UCMJ. A defendant may object to a summary court-martial
and elect to be tried by a special or general court-martial, in which harsher punish•
ments may be imposed. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970); MCM, supra note 1, ,r 16a. A special
court-martial may try any service member for most noncapital offenses. IO U.S.C.
§ 819 (1970); MCM, supra, 11 15a. A general court-martial may try any person subject
to the UCMJ for most offenses, including capital offenses, and may impose harsher
punishments than special courts-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970); MCM, supra, 1111 14a, b.
The UCMJ provides the accused with extensive procedural rights in general and
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ated with a court-martial conviction.7 Once a minor violation8 of the
UCMJ's punitive provisions9 has been alleged to the commanding
officer's satisfaction, he may proceed against the accused under article 15 or invoke a court-martial.10 If the article 15 proceeding is chospecial courts-martial. E.g., the right to appointed counsel, 10 U.S.C. § 8'1;7 (1970);
MCM, supra, 11 48a; the right to appeal guilt or appropriateness of sentence, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 859-76 (1970); MCM, supra, 1111 98-108. The summary court-martial is a less formal
procedure. MCM, supra, 11 79a. However, the accused is still provided important
procedural rights. E.g., the right to cross-examination, id. 11 79d; the right to counsel
in cases in which the service member is sentenced to confinement, United States v.
Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). See notes 106-09 infra and
accompanying text. 7. S. REP. No. 1911, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2381 (1962).
The court in United States v. Johnson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 464, 42 C.M.R. 66 (1970),
stated that the legislative history of article 15 indicated that two of the primary
reasons for its enactment were to avoid damaging service members' records with
criminal convictions and to reduce the number of less than honorable discharges,
which arc often based on a service member's former court-martial convictions. 19
U.S.C.M.A. at 467, 42 C.M.R. at 69. Court-martial convictions may also increase the
maximum punishment a service member may face for future offenses. MCM, supra
note 1, 11 127, Table of Maximum Punishments § B. An article 15 conviction cannot
increase the maximum punishment allowed for a future offense; at worst it may
persuade a judge to levy a sentence close to the allowed maximum.
8. "Generally the term 'minor' includes misconduct not involving any greater
degree of criminality than is involved in the average offense tried by summary courtmartial. This term ordinarily does not include misconduct of a kind which, if tried
by general court-martial, could be punished by dishonorable discharge or confinement
for more than one year." MCM, supra note 1, 11 128b. Examples of such offenses are
absence without leave for less than thirty days, drunkenness, and assault upon other
enlisted men. MCM, supra, 11 127c. For a case that devotes extensive discussion to
the question of what is a minor offense sec United States v. Fretwell, 11 U.S.C.M.A.
377, 380, 29 C.M.R. 193, 195-96 (1960).
9. 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (1970). See also MCM, supra note 1, 1111 155-213.
10. MCM, supra note 1, 11 129a. Procedure under article 15 is as follows:
The commanding officer, upon ascertaining to his satisfaction after any inquiry
he considers necessary that an offense punishable under Article 15 has been
committed by a member of his command, will, if he determines to exercise his
Article 15 authority, so notify the member of the nature of the alleged misconduct
by a concise statement of the offense in such terms that a specific violation of
the code is clearly stated and inform him that he intends to impose punishment
under Article 15 for the misconduct unless, if such a right exists (132), trial by
court-martial is demanded. Also, unless prohibited by regulations of the Secretary concerned, the commander may notify the member concerned of his intention to recommend to a superior commander that the member be punished under
Article 15 for his alleged misconduct unless, if such a right exists (132), trial
by court-martial is demanded. The notification will also inform the member
that he may submit any matter desired in mitigation, extenuation, or defense.
In every case, the member will be notified that he is not required to make any
statement regarding the offense or offenses of which he is accused or suspected
and that any statement made by him may be used against him in a trial by courtmartial. An election to accept nonjudicial punishment constitutes a waiver of the
right to demand trial. A demand for trial does not require that charges be preferred, transmitted, or forwarded, but punishment may not be imposed under
Article 15 while the demand is in effect.
The member will be given a reasonable time to reply to the notification of
intent to impose or recommend the imposition of Article 15 punishment, state
whether he demands trial by court-martial, if that right exists (132), and submit
any matter in extenuation, mitigation, or defense he desires to be considered.
With respect to an offense or offenses as to which a right to trial by court-
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sen the service member is apprised of the nature of the offense and of
the commanding officer's intention to impose punishment.11 The
service member must also be notified that he may demand trial by
court-martial in lieu of the article 15 proceeding;12 counsel is provided to assist him in this decision.13 The accused is not told what
specific punishments the commanding officer intends to impose, but
upon request he will be informed of the potential punishments under article 15 and under court-martial proceedings.14 Although a
court-martial would provide procedural safeguards lacking under
article 15, the potential punishment is harsher.10
martial exists but has not expressly been demanded, punishment may be imposed
immediately by the commander indicated in the notice as the commander who
is to impose the punishment. Punishment may be imposed only by the personal
action of the commander or officer delegated that authority in accordance with
128a. The member will be notified of the punishment imposed, informed of his
right to appeal to the next superior authority, and directed to acknowledge
receipt of the notification of punishment and to state his election regarding an
app{~~ proceedings will be conducted in writing in all cases involving commissioned officers and warrant officers and in all cases in which the punishment
includes reduction in grade, confinement on bread and water or diminished
rations, correctional custody, restriction or extra duties for more than 14 days,
or forfeiture or detention of pay. In other cases the proceedings may be in
writing or may be conducted orally, following the same sequence. However,
in any case the member may be permitted to appear in person before the officer
authorized to impose the punishment, and that officer may personally interview
witnesses. Any written statements or other documentary evidence pertaining to
the case which have been considered by the officer authorized to impose the
punishment shall be attached to the file in the manner prescribed by pertinent
regulations. When oral proceedings are conducted, the commander will cause a
summarized record to be made and filed.
MCM, supra, ,r 133a.
II. Id. The Manual for Courts-Martial does not provide for hearing until after
the commanding officer has decided to impose punishment.
12. Except in the case of a person attached to or embarked in a vessel, punishment may not be imposed under Article 15 upon any member of the Armed
Forces who has, before the imposition of the punishment under that article,
demanded trial by court-martial in lieu of the punishment thereunder. He also
has the right, in all cases, to refuse trial by summary court-martial (Art. 20:
16a; 79d(l)). Thus, if a serviceman refuses both punishment under Article 15
and trial by summary court-martial, he may then be tried, if at all, only by a
special or general court-martial.
Id. ,r 132; see id. ,r 16a.
13. In 1973 former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird directed that counsel be made
accessible to service members to aid them in deciding whether to demand a courtmartial. See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Report on the
Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice in the Armed Forces, January 11,
1973. For an example of an implementation of this policy see Army Reg. 27-10,
,I 3-12b (Change 12, Dec. 1973).
14. Army Reg. 27-10, ,r 3-12c (Change 12, Dec. 1973). The other services apparently
have no comparable regulations.
15. Summary courts-martial may prescribe confinement for no longer than one
month, hard labor without confinement for up to 45 days, restriction to certain specified
limits for up to two months, or forfeiture of up to two thirds of one month's pay.
10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970); MCM, supra note I, ,r 16b. Special courts-martial may prescribe
bad-conduct discharges, confinement for up to six months, hard labor without confinement for up to three months, indefinite forfeiture of up to two thirds of one's monthly
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An accused who elects to proceed under article 15 may submit
any matter in mitigation, extenuation, or defense.16 The UCMJ does
not guarantee a right to a personal hearing,17 although the army and
the navy grant a hearing as a matter of policy.18 Neither the UCMJ
nor the Manual for Courts-Martial require counsel at an article 15
hearing,19 although recent army and navy regulations allow a personal representative to speak on behalf of the accused.20 Those who
have sufficient funds may hjre a lawyer as their personal representative. 21
pay per month, or complete forfeiture of pay for up to six months. 10 U.S.C. § 819
(1970); MCM, supra, 11 15b. General courts-martial may prescribe the greatest range of
punishments, including death, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970); MCM, supra, 1114b. Compare the
more limited punishments available to commanding officers under article 15, discussed
in the text accompanying notes 22-24 infra.
16. See note 10 supra.
17. The Manual for Courts-Martial, supra note 1, is ambiguous as to the procedure for response to charges made against the service member. See note 10 supra.
18. Army Reg. 27-10, 11 3-13a (Change 12, Dec. 1973); Judge Advocate General
Manual, Revised Procedures for the Imposition of Nonjudicial Punishment (Advance
Change No. 1, May 1973).
19. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970); MCM, supra note 1, ,r 48a. See United States v. Shamel,
22 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 47 C.M.R. 116 (1973).
20. Army Reg. 27-10, ,r 3-13a (Change 12, Dec. 1973); Judge Advocate General
Manual, supra note 18 (Advance Change No. 1).
21. The army regulations make it clear that a personal representative must serve
voluntarily. The army will not order or appoint someone to fill that role. Army Reg.
No. 27-10, ,r 3-14b (Change 12, Dec. 1973). The navy also places the responsibility
of obtaining a personal representative on the accused. Judge Advocate General Manual,
supra note 18 (Advance Change No. 4).
These regulations arguably result in a denial of equal protection to service members who are financially unable to retain a lawyer. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). (The equal protection principles
of the fourteenth amendment are included in the fifth amendment guarantee of
due process, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and therefore apply to the
military.) The Court in Griffin held that a defendant could not be denied appellate
review merely because he could not afford. to purchase the stenographic transcript
or report of the trial proceedings. The Court reasoned that although there was no
constitutional right to appellate review, the state could not provide it and at the
same time establish conditions "that discriminat[e] against some convicted defendants
on account of their poverty." 351 U.S. at 18. In Douglas the Court invalidated California's requirement that an indigent defendant make a preliminary showing of the
merits of his case before counsel is appointed to represent him on appeal. A showing
of merit did not have to be made by a criminal defendant who was financially capable
of retaining counsel. The Court thus held that the practice was contrary to the
equal protection principles announced in Griffin. A broad interpretation of Griffin
and Douglas would award a right to assigned counsel to indigent persons whenever
a wealthy person is allowed to be represented by retained counsel. Appointed counsel
would be required in all article 15 proceedings under this analysis.
The Supreme Court does not appear to be willing to extend Griffin and Douglas,
however. Subsequent decisions have relied entirely upon a sixth amendment or a due
process analysis in holding that a defendant is entitled to appointed counsel. See,
e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). Furthermore, a due process element has been imputed to the Griffin-Douglas
principle itself in subsequent decisions. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
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Punishments allowed under article 15 range from a reprimand
to thirty days of correctional custody.22 A service member may also
(1971); Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Warden,
85 Nev. 83, 450 P.2d 356, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 860 (1969); Riggins v. Rhar, 7u
Wash. 2d 271, 450 P.2d 806 (1969). The use of due process or sixth amendment
analysis rather than equal protection analysis indicates that indigents do not
necessarily have a right to counsel in all situations in which counsel may be retained,
Appointment of counsel must be necessary to protect the rights of the indigent to
a fair trial in a criminal proceeding. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 2u (1972);
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22. IO U.S.C. § 815(b) (1970):
Subject to subsection (a) of this section, any commanding officer may, in addition
to or in lieu of admonition or reprimand, impose one or more of the following
disci_plinary punishments for minor offenses without the intervention of a court•
martial(1) upon officers of his command(A) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension from
duty, for not more than 30 consecutive days;
(B) if imposed by an officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction or
an officer of general or flag rank in command(i) arrest in quarters for no more than 30 consecutive days;
(ii) forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month
for two months;
(iii) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension
from duty, for not more than 60 consecutive days;
(iv) detention of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month
for three months;
(2) upon other personnel of his command(A) if imposed upon a person attached to or embarked in a vessel, confinement on bread and water or diminished rations for not more than three consecutive days;
(B) correctional custody for not more than seven consecutive days;
(C) forfeiture of not more than seven days' pay;
(D) reduction to the next inferior pay grade, if the grade from which
demoted is within the promotion authority of the officer imposing the reduction
or any officer subordinate to the one who imposes the reduction;
(E) extra duties, including fatigue or other duties, for not more than 14
consecutive days;
(F) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension from
duty, for not more than 14 consecutive days;
(G) detention of not more than 14- days' pay;
(H) if imposed by an officer of the grade of major or lieutenant com•
mander, or above-(i) the punishment authorized under subsection (b)(2)(A);
(ii) correctional custody for not more than 30 consecutive days;
(iii) forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month
for two months;
(iv) reduction to the lowest or any intermediate pay grade, if the grade
from which demoted is within the promotion authority of the officer imposing the reduction or any officer subordinate to the one who imposes the
reduction, but an enlisted member in a pay grade above E-4 may not be
reduced more than two pay grades;
(v) extra duties, including fatigue or other duties, for not more than
45 consecutive days;
(vi) restrictions to certain specified limits, with or without suspension
from duty, for not more than 60 consecutive days;
(vii) detention of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month
for three months.
Detention of pay shall be for a stated period of not more than one year but if
the offender's term of service expires earlier, the detention shall termmatc upon
that expiration. No two or more of the punishments of arrest in quarters, con•
finement on bread and water or diminished rations, correctional custody, extra
duties, and restriction may be combined to run consecutively in the maximum
amount imposable for each. Whenever any of those punishments arc combined
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suffer a reduction in rank or the levy of a fine. 23 Lesser penalties include extra duties for up to forty-five days and restriction to certain
areas for up to sixty days.24 A notation of the punishment may be included in the service member's record25 and may be introduced at a
subsequent court-martial for the purpose of sentencing.26 The service member can appeal the punishment to the next highest commanding officer27 or seek collateral review in the federal courts.28
The right of an accused to be provided counsel in an article 15
proceeding depends in the first instance on the applicability of the
Bill of Rights to military personnel.29 This issue was first raised in
Dynes v. Hoover, 80 in which a seaman found guilty of attempted desertion sought to set aside his conviction and sentence in the federal
to run consecutively, there must be an apportionment. In addition, forfeiture
of pay may not be combined with detention of pay without an apportionment.
For the purposes of this subsection, "correctional custody" is the physical restraint
of a person during duty or nonduty hours and may include extra duties, fatigue
duties, or hard labor. If practicable, correctional custody will not be served in
immediate association with persons awaiting trial or held in confinement pursuant
to trial by court-martial.
See also MCM, supra note 1, ,i 131b.
23. See note 22 supra.
24. See note 22 supra.
25. The Manual for Courts-Martial defines personnel records of the accused to
include "all those records made or maintained in accordance with departmental regulations which reflect the past conduct and performance of the accused." MCM, supra
note 1, ~ 75d. Army regulations provide that records of punishment under article 15
will be maintained in the service member's personnel file. Army Reg. 27-10, ~~ 315b(l), (2), (3) (Change 12, Dec. 1973). Records of article 15 punishments of enlisted
persons serving on active duty in the army for three years or less are withdrawn
from the service member's Military Personnel Records Jacket when: "(I) The individual is separated from the Army; (2) All punishments are set aside; (3) Two years
have expired since imposition of the punishment." Army Reg. 27-10, ~ 3-15b(3)(b)
(Change 12, Dec. 1973). (This is not true for army officers or enlisted personnel who
have completed more than three years of service. Army Reg. 27-10, ,i,i 3-15b(l)-(2)
(Change 12, Dec. 1973).) A permanent record of all article 15 punishments remains
in every service member's Official Military Personnel File. Army Reg. 27-10, ,i 3-15b
(l)(a), (2)(a), (3)(a).
26. MCM, supra note 1, ,i 75d; see United States v. Johnson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 464,
467, 42 C.M.R. 66, 69 (1970).
27. 10 U.S.C, § 815(e) (1970); MCM, supra note I, ,i 135. Only the service member's
punishment, and not his guilt, may be appealed.
28. Military court decisions cannot be appealed directly to federal courts. They
may be collaterally attacked, however, in actions seeking habeas corpus relief, back
pay, mandamus, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, or tort damages. The scope of
review in the federal courts does not vary with the form of relief sought; the
applicable criteria are set forth in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). See also
Betonie v. Sizemore, No. 73-3015 (5th Cir. July 5, 1974) (excerpted in 43 U.S.L.W.
2045); H. MOYER, JUSTICE IN THE MILITARY 1158-82 (1972).
29. See J. BISHOP, JusrrCE UNDER FmE 113-73 (1974); Henderson, Courts-Martial
and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1957);
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 181 (1962); Wiener,
Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1958).
30. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
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courts. The Supreme Court held that "[w]ith the sentences of courts
martial which have been convened regularly, and have proceeded
legally, and by which punishments are directed, not forbidden by
law, or which are according to the laws and customs of the sea, civil
courts have nothing to do, nor are they in any way alterable by
them." 31
Some authorities have argued that, since the Court in Dynes was
unwilling to consider constitutional issues on review of military decisions, the decision implied that the Bill of Rights did not apply to
the military.32 This is not the only possible interpretation, however.
The limited scope of review announced by Dynes may simply defer
to the military the balancing of individual constitutional rights and
military necessity.33 The Bill of Rights is thus not entirely inapplicable under Dynes; its scope, however, is not to be decided by the
courts but by the military, which has a better understanding of its
particular needs.34
The proper interpretation of Dynes should have been settled
by the Supreme Court's decision in Burns v. Wilson, 35 involving the
31. 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 82.
32. See 6 C.J.S. Army and Navy § 4 (1937); 5 C.J.S. Army and Navy § 9 (1916);
21 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 492 (1953). See also In re Bogart, 3 F. Cas. '796 (No. 1596)
(C.C. Cal. 1873).
33. For an example of the Supreme Court's recognition of and deferral to military
expertise, see Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 178 (1885), where the Court noted:
"Of questions, not depending upon the construction of the statutes, but upon unwritten military law or usage within the jurisdiction of courts-martial, military or
naval officers, from their training and experience in the service, are more competent
judges than the courts of common law."
34. One commentator bas urged that Dynes implied that the Congress and tl1e
President have the sole power to determine the extent to which the Bill of Rights may
be qualified to accommodate the unique needs of the military. See Note, Constitutional
Rights of Seruicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 127, 130 (1964). The
argument is based on the idea that to leave the determination of the applicability of
the Bill of Rights to the military is in fact to leave the determination to the legislative
and the executive branches, under whose control the military operates by virtue of
article I, section 8, and article ll, section 2, of the Constitution.
Although courts have intervened in determining the applicability of the Bill of
Rights to the military to a far greater extent than was apparently envisioned by Dynes,
see text accompanying notes 35-39 infra, Congress has in fact taken the lead in allowing
service members to exercise constitutional rights by enacting and amending the UCMJ.
Before the enactment of the UCMJ, military authorities often took disciplinary action
witltout regard for a service member's rights. Courts-martial commonly imposed
exorbitant punishments without providing the accused with procedural protections.
See Sherman, The Civilization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L R.Ev. 3 (1970). The UCMJ
ended the system of "drumhead justice," id. at 4, by providing accused service members
with many of the rights enjoyed by civilian defendants. See J. BISHOP, supra note 29, at
137; W. GENEROUS, SwoIU>s AND SCALES 34-53 (1973). A stated objective of the UCMJ
was to achieve a fairer balance between the military's need for discipline and the
service member's constitutional rights. See Hearings on R.R. 2198 Before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Armed Seruices, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 606 (1949) [hereinafter
House Hearings] (testimony of Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Jr., chairman of the
committee that drafted the UCMJ).
35. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
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jurisdiction of the federal courts to grant habeas corpus relief to petitioners convicted of rape and murder by air force courts-martial.
The Court acknowledged that "the rights of men in the armed forces
must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands
of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which
must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment."36 The judicial nonintervention contemplated by Dynes, however, was rejected; the Court held that federal courts could decide
whether the petitioner's allegations of deprivation of constitutional
rights were dealt with "fully and fairly" by the military courts.37 The
expansion of the scope of review was an implicit recognition that
service members are protected to some extent by the Bill of Rights,38
and a majority of cases have so held.39
It is clear, however, that service members are not protected by
the Bill of Rights to the same extent as civilians. Certain individual
rights must give way to military necessity. The Constitution, for in36. 346 U.S. at 140 (footnote omitted).
37. 346 U.S. at 142. The "fully and fairly'' test has been differently interpreted by
lower federal courts. At one extreme are cases that grant review of a constitutional
issue only if the military court did not consider the issue at all. E.g., Suttles v. Davis,
215 F.2d 760 (10th Cir.), cert..denied, 348 U.S. 903 (1954); Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483
(10th Cir. 1953). At the other extreme are cases that hold that civilian courts may
review any constitutional errors of military courts on the ground that a trial is not
"fair" if a service member is denied a constitutional right. E.g., Kauffman v. Secretary
of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1969); Sweet v. ·
Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456 (D. Kan. 1959).
Burns is consistent with other decisions holding that the judicial branch may
review the constitutionality of actions that lie within the sole power of the executive
or legislative branches. See United States v. Nixon, 42 U.S.L.W. 5237 (U.S. July 24, 1974);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
38. Although the Supreme Court recently limited the application of the first
amendment to the military setting, Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 42 U.S.L.W. 5233
(U.S. July 8, 1974); Parker v. Levy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4979 (U.S. June 19, 1974), it explicitly
held that the service member was "not excluded from the protection granted by the
First Amendment." Parker v. Levy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4979, 4987 (U.S. June 19, 1974).
The constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court are now considered binding
on military courts unless military necessity dictates otherwise. See Kauffman v. Secretary
of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 997 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1969) ("We
hold that the test of fairness requires that military ,rulings on constitutional issues
conform to Supreme Court standards, unless it is shown that conditions peculiar to
military life require a different rule.''); United States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298,
46 C.M.R. 298 (1973); United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249
(1967); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960). In Tempia
the Court of Military Appeals was most explicit, stating: "The impact of Burns ••• is
of an unequivocal holding by the Supreme Court that the protections of the Constitution are available to servicemen in military trials.'' 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 634, 37
C.M.R. at 254. See also Warren, supra note 29, at 188-89.
39. E.g., Betonie v. Sizemore, No. 73-3015 (5th Cir. July 5, 1974) (excerpted in 43
U.S.L.W. 2045); Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1969); Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
But see, e.g., Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1973); Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d
483 (10th Cir. 1953).
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stance, provides that "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces." 40
The Supreme Court has reiterated in other contexts the view
that individual guarantees must often yield to the military's need for
absolute discipline.41 In O'Callahan v. Parker,42 for instance, the
Court in dictum stated: "That a system of specialized military courts,
proceeding by practices different from those obtaining in the regular courts and in general less favorable to defendants, is necessary to
an effective national defense establishment, few would deny." 43 Most
recently the Court held that the constitutional prohibitions against
vague laws and against inhibition of free speech cannot be applied
to the military ·with the same force that they possess in civilian society.44 The Court stated bluntly: "The fundamental necessity for
obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline,
may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it." 46
The protection the service member receives from the Bill of
Rights thus depends on a balancing of the individual's constitutional
40. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V (emphasis added).
41. Referring to article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution, which grants
to Congress the power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces," the Court in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956), stated: "It has
been held that this creates an exception to the normal method of trial in civilian
courts as provided by the Constitution and permits Congress to authorize military trial
of members of the armed services without all the safeguards given an accused by
Article III of the Bill of Rights." 354 U.S. at 19. Later the Court summarized:
"It still remains true that military tribunals have not been and probably never
can be constituted in such way that they can have the same kind of qualifications
that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal
courts." In part this is attributable to the inherent differences in values and atti•
tudes that separate the military establishment from civilian society. In the military,
by necessity, emphasis must be placed on the security and order of the group rather
than on the value and integrity of the individual.
354 U.S. at 39, quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
In Ex parte Milligan, '71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the Court stated, after discussing
the exception for grand jury indictment in the fifth amendment (see text accompanying
note 40 supra):
The discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy, required other
and swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts; and,
in pursuance of the power conferred by the Constitution, Congress has declared
the kinds of trial, and the manner in which they shall be conducted, for offenses
committed while the party is in the military or naval service. Every one connected
with these branches of the public service is amenable to the jurisdiction which
Congress has created for their government, and, while thus serving, surrenders his
right to be tried by the civil courts.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 123.
42. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
43. 395 U.S. at 265.
44. Parker v. Levy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4979 (U.S. June 19, 1974).
45. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4987.
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rights against the demands of military necessity.46 The balancing approach as taken by federal courts is illustrated in Henry v. Warner,4 7
which held that defendants have a right to counsel in summary
courts-martial. The court noted that "the special attributes of military justice ... 'cannot justify denial of basic constitutional rights
when both these rights and the needs of the military can be successfully accommodated.' " 4!3 Similarly, the court in Application of
Stapley, which held that a service member has the right to adequate
counsel at a special court-martial, stated that "the assignment of defense counsel possessing at least minimal qualifications to rationally
advise on substantive and procedural legal problems may not be
deemed precluded in this day and age in the absence of a showing of
overriding military necessity that does not exist here.'' 49
Military courts, as well as federal courts, have faced the problem
of the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the military setting. Although one might have expected the military courts to have limited
constitutional rights more than federal courts, they have consistently
held, relying on Burns, that the military must accord the service
member "all the protections in the Bill of Rights, except those which
are expressly or by implication inapplicable.''50
The "express" limitation refers to the exemption of the military
from the fifth amendment requirement that a defendant accused of
a capital or "infamous" crime be held only upon presentment or indictment by a grand jury.51 What is meant by a protection "by implication inapplicable" is less clear, however. One judge states that
the phrase covers only the right to a jury trial-that is, since the sixth
amendment requires a jury trial only where a presentment or indictment is necessary, and since no presentment or indictment is needed
for military defendants, the right to a jury trial is inapplicable.52
46. E.g., Parker v. Levy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4979 (U.S. June 19, 1974); Betonie v. Sizemore,
No. 73-3015 (5th Cir. July 5, 1974) (excerpted in 43 U.S.L.W. 2045), slip op. at 5413
(dictum); Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
47. 357 F. Supp. 495 (C.D. Cal. 1973). Betonie v. Sizemore, No. 73-3015 (5th Cir.
July 5, 1974) (excerpted in 43 U.S.L.W. 2045), and United States v. Alderman, 22
U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973), also held that defendants have a right to counsel
in summary courts-martial.
48. 357 F. Supp. at 495, quoting Daigle v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 1074, 1080 (D.
Hawaii 1972).
49. 246 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D. Utah 1965) (emphasis added).
50. United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 247 (1960);
accord, United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 634, 37 C.M.R. 249, 254 (1967).
51. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
52. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution protect certain fundamental rights and privileges of persons accused of crime. With only a single express
exception, there is no withholding of the protection of these rights and privileges
from an accused because he is, at the time, serving with the armed forces of his
country. Under the express exception, set out in the Fifth Amendment, an
accused in the armed forces may be held to answer for a capital, or othenvise
infamous crime, without presentment or indictment of a grand jury. • •• To this
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Other rights apply to the military as fully as they apply to civilians.
This was apparently the view taken in United States v. Tempia,03 in
which the Court of Military Appeals reversed the conviction of an
airman who was not given the aid of appointed counsel during custodial interrogation.04 In a nonmilitary case, Miranda v. Arizona,c;r,
the Supreme Court had ruled that appointed counsel was necessary
adequately to protect the accused's fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination. The Judge Advocate General of the navy argued
that Miranda's stringent formula was undesirable in the military
context and that the military courts need not follow it. The Court
of Military Appeals flatly rejected this attempt to make an exemption for the military and held that "the views of 'the Supreme Court
of the United States on constitutional issues' are binding on us." 00
In the later case of United States v. Alderma,n,01 however, Judges
Darden and Duncan apparently agreed that the constitutional pronouncements of the Supreme Court were subject to re-evaluation by
the military courts in the light of military necessity. Alderman dealt
with the right of an indigent service member to appointed counsel
at a summary court-martial. Judge Darden remarked in dissent that
Court of Military Appeals "decisions have not applied specific provisions of the Bill of Rights to military law without regard for their
effect on the mission of the armed forces and the basic reason for
their existence. Rather, we have recognized the need for balancing
the application of the constitutional protection against military
needs."58 He concluded that unless the Supreme Court directly held
express exception may be added the implied limitation of the right of trial by
jury, as protected by the Sixth Amendment, to the extent that a jury trial is required only where presentment or indictment is necessary. • • • No other recognized exceptions have been cited and I know of none. The opinions of the
appellate courts in the Bums case, supra, support the conclusion that there arc
no other exceptions.
United States v. Sutton, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 228, 11 C.M.R, 220, 228 (1953) (Quinn, J.,
dissenting).
53. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
54. The accused was informed that he would be permitted to "retain civilian counsel
at his own expense, who could appear at his interrogation," but that "no attorney
would be appointed to represent him in any law enforcement investigation," 16
U.S.C.M.A. at 637, 37 C.M.R. at 256-57. The Manual for Courts-Martial has been
amended to incorporate the Tempia decision into the prescribed interrogation pro•
cedures. MCM, supra note 1, ,I 140a{2).
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56. 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 635, 37 C.M.R. at 255, quoting United States v. Armbruster,
11 U.S.C.M.A. 596, 598, 29 C.M.R. 412,414 (1960).
57. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). The defendant appealed his conviction
by a special court-martial on the ground that evidence of his previous conviction by a
summary court-martial should not have been admitted. He argued that since the sixth
amendment as interpreted by Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), required that
counsel be provided at a summary court-martial and counsel had not been so provided,
the conviction by the summary court-martial was invalid.
58. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 30~, 46 C.M.R. at 307,
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that the right to counsel applied to summary courts-martial, the military courts should defer to the congressional decision not to extend
the right to the military setting.59 Judge Duncan apparently agreed
with Judge Darden's assertion that "Congressional enactments deserve deference in determining the balance that must be struck between the protection of an accused's constitutional rights and the
needs of military discipline," 60 admitting that military necessity may
require an exception to a constitutional right. 61 However, he did
not find that the record contained any evidence that would warrant
a limitation on the right to counsel in the military setting.62
The view that military necessity may abrogate constitutional
rights appears to have been accepted by the Supreme Court in the
recent case of Parker v. Levy.63 At issue were articles 133 and 134 of
the UCMJ, establishing the power of a court-martial to impose punishment for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," "all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good in the armed forces,"
and "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces." 64
Levy, an army captain, argued that both articles were void for
vagueness under the due process clause of the fifth amendment and
that they were overbroad in their curtailment of free speech. Justice
Rehnquist, ·writing for the Court, admitted that "members of the
military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First _
Amendment." 65 However, the "fundamental necessity for obedience,
and the consequent necessity for the imposition of discipline,'' 66 outweighed Levy's right to express his views to enlisted personnel and
to be informed as to precisely what conduct would be considered a
criminal violation.67
Even ignoring the view that the Bill of Rights applies with full
force to the military with the exception of the presentment and in59. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 309, 46 C.M.R. at 309.
60. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 306-07, 46 C.M.R. at 306-07.
61. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 303, 46 C.M.R. at 303.
62. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 303, 46 C.M.R. at 303.
63. 42 U.S.L.W. 4979 (U.S. June 19, 1974).
64. "Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct." 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970). "Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital,
of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of
by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree
of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court." 10 U.S.C. § 934
(1970).
65. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4987.
66. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4987.
67. This holding was followed in the similar case of Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy,
42 U.S.L.W. 5233 (U.S. July 8, 1974).
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dictment requirement of the fifth amendment and the right to jury
trial of the sixth amendment,68 and accepting the view that a "fundamental" military necessity may limit a service member's rights,
courts should find a right to counsel in article 15 proceedings. As the
following discussion makes clear, no substantial military need justifies withholding that right.
One of the tw'O basic aspects of military necessity that might warrant infringement upon the rights of an individual is discipline. Discipline is essential to an effective fighting force because a commander
must be able to rely on obedience to orders by military personnel
even in the face of grave danger.69 The provision of counsel at article 15 proceedings, it might be argued, would hinder the maintenance of discipline first because it would weaken the role of the commanding officer as the ultimate arbiter of the service member's guilt.
While the commander would still decide guilt or innocence and impose sentence, counsel would provide the service member with a
spokesman for his cause, who would dispute the allegations posed by
the commander and argue that he would be ·wrong to impose punishment. The accused would identify with his counsel and not with his
superior. He will no longer perceive the commander's judgment as
beyond scrutiny.
Second, provision of counsel would arguably slow the presently
swift proceedings under article 15. Robinson 0. Everett, a noted expert on military law, has written: "Even in civilian life it is said that
'Justice delayed is justice defeated.' This statement is still truer in
military life, where, to maintain discipline, the unpleasant consequences of offenses must be quick, certain, and vivid-not something
vague in the remote future." 70
These arguments are strengthened by the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Parker, which stressed the need for obedience and discipline as a justification for narrowing first amendment rights of service members.71 The Court noted that" '[t]he armed forces depend
on a command structure that at times must commit men to combat,
not only hazarding their lives but ultimately involving the security
68. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
69. Frederick Bemams Wiener testified at the 1949 congressional hearings on the
UCMJ that "we are up against the stubborn hard fact that the purpose of an armed
force is to send men obediently to their death, and that it is very carefully designed
just for that purpose." House Hearings, supra note 34-, at 780. Wiener is a noted military writer, and at the time of the hearings he was a colonel and the commanding
officer of a Judge Advocate General service training center in the army reserves. See
also Wood, Discipline and Military Justice, 21 JUDGE .ADVOCATE J. 1 (1955), for a
thorough explanation of the need for teamwork and discipline in the military.
70. R. EVERE'IT, Mn.rrARY JusnCE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 4
(1956).
71. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
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of the nation itself. Speech that is protected in the civil population
may nonetheless undermine the effectiveness of response to command.' " 72
The discipline rationale, whatever its strengths in other settings,
cannot justify the failure to appoint counsel in article 15 cases. Providing counsel obviously would not undermine discipline to the
same extent as allowing a commissioned officer to urge publicly that
enlisted men refuse to obey orders that might send them into combat-the root of the controversy in Parker. Simply put, the obedience
to orders by combatants is the essence of military necessity; speech
encouraging disobedience is justifiably restricted. 73 The advantage
in maintaining discipline by not allowing counsel in article 15 proceedings is tenuous at best-in no sense is it directly related to the
swift obedience of combat orders.
Furthermore, considerations based on the psychology of military
service indicate that the military can better meet its need for discipline by providing counsel in an article 15 proceeding than by denying it. Experts maintain that punishment can instill obedience and
loyalty only if it is perceived as just and is associated with the individual's commanding officer. Richard H. Wels, testifying before
the House subcommittee that considered enactment of the UCMJ,
stated: "We believe that discipline is dependent in a large degree
upon the morale of the men who make up the services, and we do
not believe that there can be good morale when men feel that the
service courts which are set up to do them justice are not real and
72. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4987, quoting United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 570, 45
C.M.R. 338, 344 (1972).
73. A strong argument can be made that Parker v. Levy should be limited to
combat personnel, for whom the need for discipline becomes paramount. In this respect
it is interesting to note that increasing emphasis on service members' constitutional
rights has developed with, and perhaps is attributable to, the growth of the military from a small group of fighting men to a huge organization whose members
often have little to do with combat. After Washington's first inauguration there were
only 672 men in the army. Several million serve in the armed forces today. Warren,
supra note 29, at 187. Former Chief Justice Earl Warren, commenting on the increase
in size of the army, stated: ''When the authority of the military has such a sweeping
capacity for affecting the lives of our citizenry, the wisdom of treating the military
establishment as an enclave beyond the reach of the civilian courts almost inevitably
is drawn into question." Warren, supra, at 188.
Furthermore, technological developments have reduced the need for combat skills
and increased the need for technical specialties. Thus, today only about 14 per cent of
military personnel have job classifications that require combat skills, while 54 per cent
have special technical skills. Hearings on Nation's Manpower Revolution Before the
.Subcomm. on Employment and Manpower of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt, 8, at 2579 (1963). It is difficult to justify the subordination of the constitutional rights of all service members when only a small percentage
will be required to enter combat and obey orders that place their lives in danger.
However, it may be argued that the unflagging obedience of all service members is
necessary for optimum combat performance, and that drawing lines will be administratively inconvenient and detrimental to morale in the services.
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fair courts as we think of them here in America." 74 Similarly, as
Robert D. L'Heureux testified before the same subcommittee: "If
your code of military justice is unjust, you will not have discipline,
you ·will invite bitter resentment with which esprit de corps is impossible, you will incite characters who would never have become
criminals in civilian life to become felons in the service." 70 A former
Undersecretary of the Navy emphasized the importance of the soldier's attitude toward his commander: "The existence of discipline
depends in large measure upon the amount of respect which the personnel of the unit have for the commanding officer-respect for his
ability, his fairness, and his authority." 76
Although article 15 punishment is swift and associated with the
commanding officer, the proceeding often lacks the appearance of
justice. The absolute discretion of the commander and the secrecy
of the article 15 proceeding can create feelings of unequal treatment
among service members who are charged with the same offense. Members of racial minorities often feel that they are punished for incidents that would be ignored if committed by a white service member.77 The presence of counsel could serve as an informal review of
the commanding officer's action and thus minimize the potential for
arbitrary or prejudicial decisions. Moreover, provision of counsel
would give service members a full opportunity to articulate a defense
and would reduce the· skepticism that is inevitably fostered when individuals believe that they have been deprived of their constitutional
rights and treated unfairly. After the accused has had the opportunity
to present his views openly, the commander would still determine
guilt and levy punishment; consequently, punishment would remain
associated with the commander and would continue to reinforce his
authority. Although the presence of counsel may slow the swiftness
of the proceeding, a limit on the time by which counsel must be prepared could reduce delay. Also, the delay cost may be insignificant.
Counsel is already provided to assist the accused in choosing between
an article 15 proceeding or a court-martial; 78 the lawyer would thus
need little additional time to become familiar with the case.
74. House Hearings, supra note 84, at 641 (testimony of Richard H. Weis, Chairman,
Special Committee of Military Justice of the New York County Lawyers' Association).
75. Id. at 816 (testimony of Robert D. L'Heureux, Chief Counsel, Senate Ilanking
and Currency Committee).
76. Id. at 1122 (testimony of W. John Kenney, Undersecretary of the Navy).
77. "The Task Force has noted that nonjudicial punishment, largely because of
the wide degree of discretion possessed by the commander in this area, is the subject
of much criticism. Many blacks, for example, feel-and the Task Force statistics confirm-that nonjudicial punishment impacts on them more often, proportionately, than
on whites and that they receive nonjudicial punishment for incidents for which whites
would receive nothing." 2 REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILi•
TARY JUSIICE IN THE ARMED FORCES 87 (1972).
78. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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It should also be emphasized that the armed services have means
to achieve discipline that do not deny a service member the procedural protections of the Constitution. Military offenses are created
to punish conduct that would not be a civilian crime,79 such as failure
to salute and other forms of disrespect toward superiors.80
A second facet of military necessity that may justify infringement
of individuals' rights concerns the logistical requirements of the military. Technological advances in communications, air and land transport, and general warfare techniques have reduced the need to send
small groups of personnel into positions that do not allow a periodic
return to headquarters. However, some troops may still be placed in
strategic positions that severely limit communication and transportation, especially during wartime. Small groups of special forces personnel may be isolated in enemy territory, for example, and sailors
may be forced to occupy small vessels for long periods.
If a commanding officer invokes article 15 in such a situation, military necessity may require an exception to the service member's right
to counsel. The right, however, should be denied only when provision of counsel is in fact impossible. 81 Commissioned officers should
79. [Military] offenses are acts that would be rights in the civilian society. Take
the business of telling off the boss, that is an inalienable right of an American
citizen. If you tell off the sergeant or a commissioned officer, that is a military
offense. In the civilian life, if you do not like your job, you quit it. If you do not
like your job in the Army and quit, that is called desertion in wartime and it
carries very serious consequences. In civilian life, if people decide they do not like
working conditions and walk off jointly, that is a strike. In the Army or in the
Navy, that kind of an action is mutiny, which is one of the most serious offenses.
House Hearings, supra note 34, at 779 (testimony of Frederick :Bernams Wiener).
80. 10 u.s.c. §§ 889, 891 (1970).
!
The distinction benveen infringing on the procedural rights of the accused at a
criminal proceeding and defining a crime to include a broader range of conduct than is
proscribed by civilian codes may further distinguish Parker v. Levy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4979
(U.S. June 19, 1974) (see text accompanying notes 63-67 supra), from the article 15 case.
Arguably Parker did not demand an "overriding" military necessity for infringing on
the defendant's first amendment rights. It cited only a general need for discipline and
the great difference benveen and separation of the military and civilian systems of
justice. The military's need for obedience may justify limiting the service member's
conduct by creating offenses that would be vague or overbroad in the civilian context;
however, once a violation is alleged to have occurred, courts should demand that the
military show an overriding need before the service member's right to a fair hearing
concerning his guilt is abridged. This reading of Parker is supported in the following
passage from the opinion:
[The] Code cannot be equated to a civilian criminal code. It, and the various
versions of the Articles of War which have preceded it, regulate aspects of the
conduct of members of the military which in the civilian sphere are left unregulated. While a civilian criminal code carves out a relatively small segment of
potential conduct and declares it criminal, the Uniform Code of Military Justice
essays more varied regulation of a much larger segment of the activities of the more
tightly knit military community. In civilian life there is no legal sanction-civil or
criminal-for failure to behave as an officer and a gentleman; in the military
world, Art. 133 imposes such a sanction on a commissioned officer. The Code
likewise imposes other sanctions for conduct that in civilian life is not subject to
criminal penalties••••
42 U.S.LW. at 4984.
81. Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 827(c)(l) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, ,i 6c, which create a similar
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be assigned to act as defense counsel for the accused if no Ia-wyer is
available, as is the practice in a special court-martial.B2 Perhaps the
proceeding can be delayed until counsel is available. In order to ensure that the military necessity justification is not abused the commanding officer should be required to make a detailed written explanation of why counsel could not be obtained.Ba
Except in the extreme situations discussed above, there is no
"fundamental"B4 military necessity that vitiates the application of
the sixth amendment to the military. Whether the accused in an
article 15 proceeding has the right to appointed counsel thus depends
on the substantive requirements for the application of the sixth
amendment as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the civilian
context.
The first requirement is that the defendant seeking counsel be
under threat of criminal prosecution.BG The Supreme Court has
exception for special courts-martial. Qualified legal counsel must be provided unless
they "cannot be obtained on account of physical conditions or military exigencies."
Use of this exception is carefully scrutinized; if qualified counsel is not obtained, "the
convening authority shall make a detailed written statement to be appended to the
record, stating why counsel ••• could not be obtained." IO U.S.C. § 827(c)(l) (1970), Sec
also MCM, supra, 11 6c.
82. MCM, supra note I, 1J 6c.
83. See note 81 supra.
84. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
85. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ••• to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI (emphasis added).
There is a possibility that an accused has a right to counsel that does not require
that he be subject to a criminal prosecution, derived under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment rather than under the sixth amendment. In In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the right to counsel was spoken of as a necessary requirement of a fair hearing, 387 U.S. at 38-41, suggesting that the right has an independent
basis in the due process clause, apart from the characterization of a juvenile proceeding as "criminal." But see 387 U.S. at 59-60 (Black, J., concurring). This reading
of Gault is supported in the later case of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971), in which the Court asserted that the juvenile court proceeding has not yet
been held to be a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the sixth amendment
and thus implicitly characterized Gault as relying on the due process standard of
"fundamental fairness" for the right to counsel. 403 U.S. at 543. A due process right to
counsel was also found in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), in which the Supreme
Court held that before a state can lawfully cut off welfare benefits it must afford the
recipient a hearing at which he may be represented by counsel. 397 U.S. at 261, 270,
See also Heryford v. Parker, 396 F,2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486,
446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968); In re Fisher, excerpted in 43 U.S.L.W. 2050
(Ohio Sup. Ct. July IO, 1974); Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional
Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH, L. REv.
717, 742-52 (1974).
The existence of a right to counsel under the due process clause in the article 15
context would depend upon a balancing of the individual's interest in being represented by counsel and the military's interest in proceeding without the intervention
of counsel. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-65 (1970); Grano, supra, at 744, It
should be pointed out that the balancing required under the due process clause would
be much more flexible and unpredictable than the balancing required to determine
if the sixth amendment applies to the military (see text accompanying notes 29-83
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employed two tests to determine whether a particular proceeding is
a criminal prosecution. The first test, which assesses whether the
proceeding at issue results in a punitive sanction, was applied in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.so The Court there found an expatriation proceeding conducted by the Immigration Service against individuals who left the United States to evade military service to be a
criminal prosecution. Although the Court listed a number of criteria
to use in determining the purpose of the sanction,s1 it ultimately
relied on legislative history to show that the imposition of expatriation was intended to be a punishment.ss
The second test balances the governmental interests in conducting the proceeding without certain procedural safeguards against
the detriment to the individual who is the subject of the proceeding.so The Court ·will consider the proceeding criminal if the individual's interests outweigh the governmental interests. The particular
right under consideration will influence the outcome; a court may
hold that a proceeding is criminal when considering some procedural safeguards but not when considering others.90
supra). The latter inquiry, which should perhaps not be termed a "balancing" at all,
determines only if there is a specific fundamental military need that vitiates an individual's constitutional right. The due process inquiry, on the other hand, would
consider matters such as cost and administrative feasibility to determine whether a right
exists. It is also not clear what balance yields a right to appointed counsel, as distinguished from the right to be represented by retained counsel. Full discussion of a
potential right to counsel under the due process clause is beyond the scope of this
Note. See also text accompanying notes 98-103 infra.
86. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
87. The criteria the Court listed were:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned ••••
372 U.S. at 168-69.
88. 372 U.S. at 169-70.
89. See Note, Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity, and Comment in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings, 72 MICH, L REv. 84, 90 (1973).
90. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court held that a juvenile delinquency
proceeding was criminal for the purpose of allowing the exercise of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Although the governmental interest in discarding
the rigidities and technicalities of the criminal law so as better to treat and rehabilitate
the juvenile was recognized, 387 U.S. at 15-16, the Court felt that it was outweighed by
the interest of the juvenile in invoking the fifth amendment. Several years later, in
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court again used the balancing approach and again decided to treat a juvenile delinquency proceeding as a criminal
trial. 397 U.S. at 361-64. The procedural safeguard at issue in Winship was the rule
placing the burden of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the government.
After emphasizing the importance of the rule historically and in modem practice, the
Court compared the protections it afforded the individual with the governmental
interest in maintaining flexibility in juvenile proceedings. 397 U.S. at 365·68, It did not
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Evaluating article 15 proceedings under both of these tests is not
necessary. The balancing test, it is submitted, is not needed if the
purpose of the sanction is clearly punitive; a court should use it only
when the purpose of the sanction is not clear. Thus, the Court in
Kennedy relied on legislative history that definitively indicated that
expatriation was meant to be a punishment.91 By comparison, the
proceedings at issue in cases using the balancing test were arguably
nonadversary inquiries with nonpunitive purposes.92
There is strong evidence that the purpose of an article 15 proceeding is to impose punishment. One indication is the title of article
15-"commanding officer's nonjudicial punishment." 93 Another is
the legislative history of the article, which indicates that one of its
purposes was to enable commanding officers to impose "increased
punishments substantially the same as those now within the punitive
authority of a summary court-martial." 94 In addition, military courts
view an article 15 proceeding as an alternative to court-martial, and
thus punitive in nature.05 In light of this evidence, a court should
consider an article 15 proceeding to be a criminal prosecution under
the Kennedy test.
The holding of the Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin° 0
may present a second requirement for the application of the sixth
amendment in article 15 proceedings. The Court there held that the
labeling of a crime as a misdemeanor or a felony has no significance
for the defendant's right to counsel; instead, counsel must be provided in any case where the sentence "actually leads to imprisonment
even for a brief period."97
The effect of the Argersinger holding on the article 15 right to
perceive "any merit in the argument that to afford juveniles the protection of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt would risk destruction of beneficial aspects of the juvenile
process." 397 U.S. at 366. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court,
employing the balancing test, found that juvenile proceedings were not criminal for
the purpose of requiring trial by jury.
91. 372 U.S. at 167.
92. See note 85 supra.
93. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970) (emphasis added).
94. Hearings on H.R. 11257 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962) (testimony of Major General Albert M, Kuhfeld,
Judge Advocate General of the United States Air Force) [hereinafter Kuhfeld Testimony].
95. The Court of Military Review stated in United States v. Delancy, 44 C.M.R.
367, 368 (1971), that "it is patent that [article 15] is punitive in nature" and that it
serves as an alternative to court-martial. Delaney was charged with obstructing justice
by interfering with an article 15 proceeding. In defense he claimed that only interference with a formal judicial proceeding could constitute obstruction of justice, and
that article 15 did not give rise to such proceedings. The Court of Military Review
disagreed on both points.
96. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
97. 407 U.S. at 33.
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counsel is unclear. First, Argersinger arose under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and presents a binding inter:pretation of the sixth amendment only to the extent that the Supreme Court has incorporated the sixth amendment into the fourteenth. There are some grounds for arguing that imprisonment is
irrelevant under the sixth amendment per se. The opinion, like the
opinion in Gideon v. Wainright,98 is cast in terms of "fundamental
rights" 99 and the prerequisites of a "fair trial" 100-terms directly
related to due process of law but unrelated to the presence or absence
of a "criminal· prosecution," the sole requirement for a right to
counsel expressly stated in the sixth amendment. Thus, it is possible
that the imprisonment test simply identifies those situations in which
the fundamental rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 101
demand the provision of counsel under the due process clause.102 To
the extent that the right to counsel in article 15 proceedings depends
only on the requirements of the sixth amendment, and not upon
whether lack of counsel would be a deprivation of due process, imposition of a sentence of imprisonment may be irrelevant.103
Even if A rgersinger was an interpretation of the sixth amendment, it did not require a sentence of imprisonment as a precondition of the right to counsel. The Court expressly reserved decision
on instances in which the accused is not sentenced to jail: ''We need
not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards
the right to counsel where loss ·of liberty is not involved, however,
for here, petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail."104 It is thus possible
that an article 15 defendant may have a right to counsel even if not
sentenced to correctional custody, and even if correctional custody is
not considered imprisonment.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, found no convincing
reason to draw the line at imprisonment: "The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee that property, as well as life and liberty, may
not be taken from a person without affording him due process of law.
The majority opinion suggests no constitutional basis for distinguishing between deprivations of liberty and property." 105 Thus, although
98. 372 U.S. 335 (1973).
99. 407 U.S. at 32.
100. 407 U.S. at 31.
101. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
102. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 395 F.2d 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1968): "It is the
likelihood of involuntary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for a
crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a
feeble-minded or mental incompetent-which commands observance of the constitutional safeguards of due process."
103. There may indeed be an independent right to counsel under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, however. See note 85 supra.
104. 407 U.S. at 37.
105. 407 U.S. at 51. Justice Powell would not extend the right to all cases involving
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the Supreme Court has not yet required counsel in nonimprisonment
cases, there is a sound basis for arguing that the right may eventually
be further extended.
The Court of Military Appeals, in a decision on a service member's right to counsel handed down after A rgersinger, failed to recognize that the Supreme Court did not rule that a sentence of imprisonment is required to invoke the protection of the sixth amendment.
United States v. Alderman106 held that Argersinger applies to summary courts-martial; the imposition of a sentence of confinement,
which the court held equivalent to imprisonment, thus triggered a
right to counsel.107 Mere restriction, however, which results only in
a " 'deprivation of privileges,' " 108 was not held to be imprisonment
and so did not require provision of counsel. The court apparently
ignored or misread the Supreme Court's caveat in Argersinger, holding that "[t]he Court's repeated reference to actual confinement
implies that a trial resulting in other types of punishment does not
require appointment of counsel for the accused."109
Even if a sentence of imprisonment is or becomes a prerequisite
of the sixth amendment right to counsel, however, strong arguments
can be made that the imposition of correctional custody under article
15 is tantamount to imprisonment.
The. characterization of correctional custody as imprisonment
was discussed in United States v. Shamel,11° the only case to deal
directly with a right to counsel under article 15. The petitioner, a
defendant in a summary court-martial, argued that admission of
evidence that he had served thirty days of "correctional custody"
under article 15 was reversible error because he had been denied his
imprisonment. He favors a case-by-case approach that would weigh the complexity of
the charge, the probable sentence, and individual factors such as the competency of the
defendant. 407 U.S. at 64.
106. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
107. See also Betonie v. Sizemore, No. 73-3015 (5th Cir. July 5, 1974) (excerpted in
43 U.S.L.W. 2045); Henry v. Warner, 357 F. Supp. 495 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
We find the differences between courts-martial and civilian criminal trials to be
much less significant than the similarities between the two types of proceedings,
at least with respect to the Sixth Amendment. Both types of proceedings may
lead to deprivation of liberty as well as property. Both generate potentially severe
social stigma. Both have significant repercussions beyond their immediate impact,
in particular in the area of future employment. We have been pointed to no
convincing reason why Argersinger v. Hamlin, • • • with its rejection of the
distinction between petty and serious crimes should not establish the framework
for Sixth Amendment analysis of military proceedings.
Betonie v. Sizemore, No. 73-3015, slip op. at 5411 (5th Cir. July 5, 1974) (excerpted in
43 U.S.L.W. 2045).
108. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 302, 46 C.M.R. at 302, quoting United States v. Modessett, 9
U.S.C.M.A. 152, 154, 25 C.M.R. 414, 416 (1958). See text accompanying notes 126-27
infra.
109. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 301, 46 C.M.R. at 301.
110. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 47 C.M.R. 116 (1973).
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constitutional right to counsel during the article 15 proceeding.
Although the court refused to hold that Argersinger required the
recognition of a right to counsel in an article 15 proceeding, the
three justices were unable to agree on a single rationale for their
decision. Writing for the court, Judge Quinn reasoned that Argersinger was not controlling because correctional custody was not
imprisonment. He analogized correctional custody to military restriction111 or to detention of a student after school hours,112 rather
than to the imprisonment of a civilian or to military confinement.
Judge Duncan, in dissent, argued that the substantial similarity of
correctional custody and confinement mandated the extension of
the right to counsel to any article 15 proceeding resulting in correctional custody.113 Chief Judge Darden merely cited his dissent in
Alderman, in which he argued that the military court should not
follow Argersinger because the Supreme Court did not affirmatively
indicate that the decision was clearly applicable to the military.114
He acknowledged, however, that if Argersinger did apply to summary
courts-martial it would be difficult to argue against a requirement
of counsel in article 15 proceedings that may result in correctional
custody.115 Thus, two of three judges (Duncan and Darden) believed
that correctional custody was a form of imprisonment that would
trigger a right to counsel under Argersinger, and two judges (Duncan
and Quinn) acknowledged that Argersinger was in fact the applicable
standard.
Although the contortions of the court in Shamel indicate that the
analogy is not ·without difficulty, correctional custody under article
15 strongly resembles military confinement, which was held to be
imprisonment in United States v. Alderman.116
111. See text accompanying note 108 supra and text accompanying notes 126-27
infra.
112. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 362, 47 C.M.R. at 117.
113. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 363-64, 47 C.M.R. at 118-19.
114. United States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 309, 46 C.M.R. 298, 309 (1973).
Judge Darden's argument was that the separation between the civilian and military
systems of justice requires that the decisions of the Supreme Court not be given decisive
weight in the military context unless specifically made applicable to the military.
22 U.S.C.M.A. 307-09, 46 C.M.R. 307-09. This argument, however, appears to have been
foreclosed in United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). See
text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
115. While it may be argued that counsel should be required for summary
courts-martial since they constitute criminal convictions and not for Article 15
proceedings as they are non-judicial and corrective in nature, the effect of confinement under the former and correctional custody under the latter is difficult
to distinguish•••• Consequently, I would have difficulty in sustaining the position that while counsel must be provided before summary courts-martial, they
may be dispensed with in Article 15 proceedings that may result in correctional
custody.
22 U.S.C.M.A. at 308 n.l, 46 C.M.R. at 308 n.l. See Leonhardt, Nonjudicial Punishment
Under the New Article 15-An Explanation, 17 JAG J., Feb.-March 1963, at 25, 33.
116. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). See text accompanying notes 106-09
supra.
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Confinement differs little from a civilian jail sentence. Army
regulations provide for confinement sentences to be served in any
federal penal or correctional institution, as well as in military
facilities. 117 Confined army personnel, like civilian prisoners, serve
their sentences in minimum, medium, or maximum custody.118
Those in minimum custody normally can be employed or trained
outside the confinement facility under minimum supervision.110
Those in maximum custody can be employed only inside the confinement facility; an armed guard must accompany them when they
are outside of the facility. 120 Locked cells house all army prisoners,121
and each prisoner engages in individually tailored correctional treatment activities, primarily job training and employment.122
The physical restrictions that an article 15 proceeding may impose are arrest in quarters,123 restriction to an area,124 and correctional custody.125 Arrest in quarters and restriction to an area are
not analogous to confinement because they are "enforced by a moral
obligation rather than by physical means.''126 Although the severity
of the restraint varies depending upon its duration and the geographical limits it sets,121 restriction to an area is the least harsh
physical restraint possible under an article 15 proceeding. Neither
arrest in quarters nor restriction to an area seems severe enough to
constitute "imprisonment" as the term was used in Argersinger.
By contrast, correctional custody is an enforced physical restraint128 that is similar to confinement. There are some differences;
for example, time spent in correctional custody does not extend the
tour of duty of army personnel,129 as does time spent in confinement;130 army personnel in correctional custody may perform their
normal work during normal duty hours; 131 they may also receive
117. Army Reg. 190-4, fJ 1-3a(l) (Change 4, June 1971).
118. Army Reg. 190-4, 1111 4--la(2)•(4) (Change 5, Jan. 1972).
119. Army Reg. 190-4, fJ 4--la{2) (Change 5, Jan. 1972).
120. Army Reg. 190-4, fJ 4--la(4) (Change 5, Jan. 1972),
121. Army Reg. 190-4, 11 6-3 Oune 1969).
122. Army Reg. 190-4, ,r 3-lb (Change 3, March 1971).
123. 10 U.S.C. § 815(b)(l)(B)(i) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, 11 131b(l)(b)I (for officers
only).
124. IO U.S.C. § 815(b)(l)(A) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, 'J 13lb(l)(a) (officers); 10
U.S.C. §§ 815(b)(2)(F), {H)(vi) (1970); MCM, supra, 1111 13lb(2)(a)6, (b)6 ("other
personnel'').
125. IO U.S.C. §§ 815{b)(2)(B), (H)(i) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, 11,1 l3lb(2)(a)2, (b)2
(nonofficers only).
126. MCM, supra note I, 11 131c(3).
127. Id. 11 13Ic(2).
128. Id. 11 131c(4).
129. Army Reg. 27-10, 11 3-Sc(l) (Change 12, Dec. 1973).
130. IO U.S.C. § 972 (1970).
131. Army Reg. 27-10, 11 3-8c(2)(f) (Change 12, Dec. 1973).
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certain privileges not available in confinement.132 Nevertheless, correctional custody is a substantial deprivation of liberty. While the
army declares that it is not confinement and that persons so
punished should not be considered prisoners,133 the navy holds
"[t]he status of correctional custody prisoners [to be similar] to that
of sentenced prisoners." 134 The UCMJ states that "'correctional
custody' is the physical restraint of a person during duty or nonduty
hours and may include extra duties, fatigue duties, or hard labor." 135
Various service regulations offer further evidence that the physical constraints of correctional custody are as severe as those of imprisonment. The army requires that correctional custody be served
in a separate facility that prevents contact with other personnel.136
Individuals under such custody must spend all nonduty hours, including nights, weekends, and holidays, in the correctional facility.137
The facility should be "austere and conducive to the rigorous and
purposeful correction of these persons." 138 Heavy wire screening or
other sturdy material often covers windows,139 and unarmed guards
may control the movement of individuals under custody.140 Although
the army and the navy attempt not to place persons in correctional
custody in the same stockades as those under confinement,141 separate
placement is not required by the UCMJ.142 Moreover, the maximum
punishment for escape from correctional custody is the same penalty
that a service member faces if he escapes from confinement or breaks
arrest.143 Finally, there is evidence that Congress enacted article 15
to allow commanders to impose "increased pun~hments substantially
132. Army personnel undergoing correctional custody are authorized to wear
insignia, decorations, and badges, and they cannot be required to wear any markings that
would identify them as prisoners. They are authorized and required to salute when
appropriate. Army Pamphlet 27-4 [hereinafter Army Pam.], ,i 16 ijune 1972).
133. Army Reg. 27-10, ,i 3-8c(2)(c) (Change 12, Dec. 1973).
134. United States v. Shamel, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 364, 47 C.M.R. 116, 117 (Duncan,
J., dissenting), quoting Department of the Navy Corrections Manual ,i 109(4) ijune
1972).
135. IO U.S.C. § 815(b) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, ,i 13lc(4).
136. Army Pam., supra note 132, ,i 13b.
137. Id. 11 10.
138. Army Pam., supra note 132, ,i 14. See also Army Reg. 27-10, ,i 3-8c(2)(d)
(Change 12, Dec. 1973).
139. Army Pam., supra note 132, ,i 15b.
140. Id.
141. The army provides that correctional custody will not be served in a facility
utilized for confinement of military prisoners. Army Reg. 27-10, ,i 3-8c(2)(c) (Change 12,
Dec. 1973); Army Pam., supra note 132, ,i 13a. The navy provides that correctional
custody may on occasion be served in confinement facilities. Regulations Supplementing the Manual for Court-Martial, Manual of the Judge Advocate General of the
Navy § 010le(2) (Change 4, Nov•.1973).
142. 10 u.s.c. § 815(b) (1970).
143. 10 U.S.C. § 895 (1970); MCM, supra note 1, ,i 174.
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the same as those now within the punitive authority of a summary
court-martial.''144
The similarity of correctional custody to confinement indicates
that Judge Quinn's analysis in Shamel was erroneous and that Judges
Duncan and Darden were correct in concluding that correctional
custody is imprisonment. Argersinger thus requires that a service
member be given a right to counsel in an article 15 proceeding that
results in correctional custody.
Arg~rsinger, however, left unsettled the question whether "right
to counsel" requires the appointment of a fully trained attomey-atIaw. Although the term apparently refers to representation by a
lawyer, a substantial number of federal and military court decisions
have held that the military can comply with the sixth amendment by
providing the accused with nonlawyer counsel.146
The cases that reached this result involved challenges to article 27
of the UCMJ, which allowed appointment of nonlawyer counsel at
special courts-martial.146 Kennedy v. Commandant141 ruled on the
propriety of appointment of a nonlegally trained officer to defend
an indigent service member. Kennedy did not contend that his appointed counsel was inadequate or ineffective. He argued instead
that appointment of a nonlegally trained officer was a per se violation
of his sixth amendment right. The court held "that the qualifications
for counsel prescribed by Congress in article 27 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice fully comply with the right to counsel requirements of the Sixth Amendment."148 The Court of Military Appeals
reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Culp. 140
144. Kuhfeld Testimony, supra note 94, at 5.
145. E.g., Angle v. Laird, 429 F.2d 892, 895-96 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 918 (1971); Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 892, 900 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U:S. 934 (1969); Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1967);
Altmayer v. Sanford, 148 F.2d 161, 162 (5th Cir. 1945); Romero v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528,
531-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A.
199, 216, 33 C.M.R. 411, 428 (1963).
146. See United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 217, 33 C.M.R. 411, 428 (1963).
147. 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967).
148. 377 F.2d at 343.
The precedential value of Kennedy has been weakened in two respects. First, the
case was effectively overruled in 1968 by an amendment to the UCMJ that requires
legally trained counsel at a special court-martial except where precluded by "physical
conditions or military exigencies." IO U.S.C. § 827(c)(l) (1970); MCM, supra note 1,
11 6c; see H. MOYER, supra note 28, at 388-89. Second, the result in Kennedy was
reached in part because the maximum punishment involved was confinement for six
months, see IO U.S.C. § 819 (1970); MCM, supra note I, 11 15b, a penalty that the
court termed "nevertheless as and for a misdemeanor under the civil law." 377 F.2d at
343. At that time-before Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), had been dccided"it [was] an open question whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is applicable
in misdemeanor cases." 377 F.2d at 343. To the extent that the court relied on the
felony-misdemeanor distinction discarded in Argersinger its opinion lacks prccedential
value.
149. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963). Each of the three judges in Culp
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It is difficult to accept the view that a nonlawyer officer can adequately protect the rights of a service member. As Judge Ferguson
stated in his concurring opinion in Culp:
An officer of the armed services of necessity cannot receive the training required to perform adequately as counsel for an accused. At the
most, he receives a general orientation course in military law during
his attendance at various service schools or takes a few sub-courses in
various aspects of its administration. At no time is he subjected to
the rigorous and intensive process which fits one to become the advocate of an individual enmeshed in the toils of the criminal law. To
me, it is just unthinkable to conclude that the best intentioned layman can be taught by attendance at a few generalized lectures to
become a capable representative of another in a criminal prosecution. The argument is the same as if one taking a course in business
law attempted to represent a large corporation in a merger or antitrust proceedings. And, as military appellate authorities well know,
the result usually looks like something intended for entertainment
at a church social.150
Persons with practical experience in the system of military justice
echo Judge Ferguson's opinion. One commentator has recently
remarked that "[most] officers have only the haziest notion about
what the code is all about, and if you can find one officer in ten who
has actually read fifty pages of the code, the Manual or the Handbook
you are extremely lucky." 151
The argument that the right to counsel requires provision of
trained lawyers is supported in the opinions of the Supreme Court.
In Powell v. Alabama,152 for instance, the Court stated:
had a different reason for upholding the use of nonlawyer counsel. Judge Kilday felt
that the sixth amendment right to counsel did not apply to the military at all. 14
U.S.C.M.A. at 215-16, 33 C.M.R. at 427-28. Judge Quinn believed that nonlawyers
provided the service members with adequate representation. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 217, 33
C.M.R. at 429. Judge Ferguson believed that the rights of the accused had not been
violated because he had chosen to be represented by nonlawyers. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 219,
33 C.M.R. at 431.
150. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 219-20, 33 C.M.R. at 431-32. Judge Ferguson stated additional
reasons for his reservations on the adequacy of nonlawyer representation:
Aside from the inability of an officer counsel to perform his duties because of
lack of proper grounding in law, there is also the important question of the ethical
responsibilities imposed by our profession upon its members. Laymen will never
understand an attorney's devotion to the interests of an "obviously guilty'' client or
the single-minded loyalty to the latter's cause which almost unexceptionally characterizes the practice of law. Too often, it must seem to the officer untrained in
the law that his duty lies in the direction of the armed force to which he belongs
rather than to the accused whom he represents, and there has not been inculcated
in him any of the principles which so naturally form a part of the legal profession
and which have impenetrably shielded the client's cause through the ages. It is
difficult enough for a military lawyer to withstand the pressures exerted against his
principal in the name of discipline and authority.
14 U.S.C.M.A. at 220, 33 C.M.R. at 432.
151. Sherman, The Right to Competent Counsel ••• in Special Courts Martial, 54
A.B.A.J. 866, 869 (1968).
152. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally,
of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.153

In Gideon v. Wainwright154 the Court was more explicit:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions
and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals
in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble
ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to
face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.155
If "the intelligent and educated layman" is viewed as incompetent
to represent himself, such a layman necessarily cannot be considered
adequate counsel for another.156
It should also be noted that the military is compelled to provide
lawyer-counsel at interrogations prior to adjudicatory proceedings,107
in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v.
Arizona.158 It would be anomalous to hold that the military is not
constitutionally compelled to provide lawyer-counsel at the criminal
trial itself.
'
Even if it is held that appointment of lawyer-counsel at a military criminal proceeding is not necessary, an indigent has the indisputable right to ·the "effective assistance of counsel.''159 At a mini153. 287 U.S. at 68-69; accord, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
154. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
155. 372 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added).
156. Law students under faculty supervision should be allowed to serve as counsel,
however; the supervision would ensure that the accused would have representation by
an individual with sufficient skills. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
157. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
158. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
159. See, e.g., Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965); Application of Stapley,
246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965); United States v. Colarusso, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 39
C.M.R. 94 (1969); United States v. Evans, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 39 C.M.R. 3 (1968); United

June 1974]

Notes

1459

mum this right entitles the accused to the appointment of a person
competent in military law. Both military and federal courts have
found a denial of an accused's sixth amendment right when the
counsel appointed to represent the accused lacked sufficient competence.160 In Application of Stapley,161 for instance, two nonlawyer
officers were appointed as counsel in a special court-martial for a
nineteen-year-old soldier accused of fraud in the issuance of checks.
One officer was a veterinarian with only two days of training in military law, and the other officer was a second lieutenant who had
studied the UCMJ in a Reserve Officer Training Corps program but
who had neither special knowledge or ability in military law nor
practical experience in legal matters or procedures generally. The
officers advised the accused to plead guilty to the charges against him.
Although the court admitted the good faith of both officers, it held
that their representation did not satisfy the requirements of the
sixth amendment:
[Minimal] requirements of due process and the Sixth Amendment are
not satisfied by the assignment as counsel to an accused of officers
with substantially no experience, training or knowledge in the field
of law, either military or civilian.... [W]ith the increasing personnel
in the military service, the rapidity and ease of transportation and
the training facilities and techniques readily available for specialized training or experience, it is no longer either reasonable or
necessary, if it ever were, to deem any officer qualified to act as
defense counsel for an accused merely because he is an officer.162
.
The argument must be met that requiring appointment of
trained counsel _in all article 15 proceedings imposing correctional
custody would place too heavy a burden on the resources of the
military justice system. Predictions that it will be impossible to provide the lawyers necessary to afford basic procedural protections have
been made in the past, however, even with respect to protections
contained in the UCMJ,1 63 and they have proved to be inaccurate.164
States v. Home, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 26 C.M.R. 381 (1958); United States v. Allen, 8
U.S.C.M.A 504, 25 C.M.R. 8 (1957).
160. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); Ashe v. McNamara, 355
F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965); Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965);
United States v. Colarusso, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 39 C.M.R. 94 (1969) (sixth amendment
right not mentioned but conviction reversed because defendant's appointed counsel had
not objected to inadmissible evidence); United States v. Evans, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 39
C.M.R. 3 (1968) (appointment of ineffective counsel constitutes reversible error);
United States v. Henn, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 124, 32 C.M.R. 124 (1962); United States v.
Gardner, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 25 C.M.R. 310 (1958).
.
161. 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
162. 246 F. Supp. at 321.
163. See Richardson, A State of War and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 47
A.B.A.J. 793 (1961).
164. See Cobbs, The Uniform Code of Military Justice in Wartime-Another View,
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Furthermore, counsel would be required only if the service
member is sentenced to correctional custody, which occurs infrequently.165 In accordance with Argersinger the commanding officer
would have to determine the need for counsel before the commencement of proceedings by reviewing the evidence to ascertain if correctional custody is a likely punishment. Overcaution might boost the
number of counsel needed to a number greater than one might
expect from the frequency of the imposition of correctional custody.
However, as noted above,166 counsel is already provided to every
service member charged with a minor violation to give him assistance
in making the election benveen proceeding under article 15 or under
a court-martial. Since this lawyer must become acquainted with
the case in order to give adequate legal advice, provision of counsel
for the article 15 proceeding should not increase significantly the
strain on the legal departments of the services.
A final argument of those opposed to provision of counsel under
article 15 may be that a service member waives his right to counsel
by electing to submit to an article 15 proceeding rather than a
court-martial, in which counsel is appointed.167 The difficulty with
this argument is that a service membet who elects a trial by courtmartial exposes himself to greater maximum punishments than are
allowed under article 15;168 he is thus coerced, or at least encouraged,
not to assert his constitutional right.169
An analogous situation came before the Supreme Court in United
States v. ]ackson.110 The case involved a section of the Federal Kidnapping Act that encouraged guilty pleas by providing that only a
jury could impose the death penalty. The Court held that the
section was an unconstitutional burden on the defendant's fifth
amendment right to plead not guilty and on his sixth amendment
48 A.B.A.J. 1123, 1124-25 (1962); Learner, Uniform Code of Military Justice: It Will
Work During a State of War, 47 A.B.A.J. 1092 (1961).
165. The frequency with which correctional custody was imposed under article 15
in 1973 is shown in the following table:

Total Nonjudicial
Punishments
January-March
April-June
July-September
October-December

49,199
48,097
45,781
41,459

Correctional
Custodies
142

138
180
38

Telephone interview with the Office of the Clerk of the Court, Judge Advocate Gen•
eral, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., July 16, 1974.
166. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
167. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
168. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
169. See Wood, supra note 69, at 7-8; Note, supra note 3.
170. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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right to a jury trial, stating: "Whatever might be said of Congress'
objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the
exercise of basic constitutional rights." 171
Several courts have adopted the Jackson rationale and have held
that a service member does not waive counsel by electing to submit
to a summary court-martial even though he could have had counsel
by exposing himself to the greater possible penalties of a special or
general court-martial.172 While the Court of Military Appeals has
never addressed the issue in the article l!5 context, it probably would
not sustain the waiver argument.
The right to counsel is but one of the procedural safeguards that
protect civilian misdemeanants but are denied to service members
accused and punished under article 15. Those opposed to the
extension of the right to counsel may thus argue that to recognize the
right is to allow "the camel's nose to peek into the tent"-the right
to counsel will be followed by the application of the right to crossexamination, the prohibition against double jeopardy, and all the
other procedural safeguards not present under article 15.173 The
recognition of the full panoply of civilian safeguards, the argument
goes, will rob article 15 of the procedural flexibility its purpose requires. Two responses may be made to this argument. First, to the
extent that procedural reforms are compatible with the function of
article 15 and the unique needs of the military, their institution is
desirable and probably constitutionally compelled. Second, each right
must be judged on the basis of its particular constitutional status and
the effect it would have on military operations. To transplant automatically the arguments for extension of the right to counsel to the
question of the applicability of the double jeopardy prohibition, for
instance, would be to paint ,;vi.th too broad a brush. The right to
counsel, as the Supreme Court has observed,174 is unique: It is fundamental to the right to be heard, and it must not be denied for less
than the most urgent of reasons.
171. 390 U.S. at 582,
Although Jackson involved a capital crime, and its holding may arguably be limited
to capital cases, the courts that extended the right to counsel to summary courtsmartial implicitly rejected such a limitation. See text accompanying note 172 infra. Cf.
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
172, Henry v. Warner, 357 F. Supp. 496 (C.D. Cal. 1973); United States v. Alderman,
22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
173. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
174. See text accompanying note 153 supra.

